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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Securities Regulation-Amendment of the Social and Political Exclusion
for Shareholder Proxy Proposals
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently adopted
certain amendments to its rule governing shareholder proxy solicita-
tions.' Probably the most important amendment is the revision in rule
14a-8(c)(2), which deals with the right of management of a corporation
to exclude from its proxy statement a shareholder proposal dealing with
a general social or political issue. This revision is the latest development
in the growing management-shareholder controversy over the proper
scope of shareholder initiative in forming corporate policy.
In order to increase shareholder participation in the governing of
corporations, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 empowered the
SEC to make rules governing the solicitation of proxies by any person
in respect of any security registered under the Act.2 Nevertheless, it was
not until 1942 that the SEC implemented the statute with a rule requir-
ing management to include in its annual proxy statement a shareholder
proposal to be made at the annual shareholder meeting.3 The rule
carried the limitation that management could omit a shareholder pro-
posal from the proxy statement if it concerned a matter that was not a
"proper subject" for shareholder consideration under the law of the
state of incorporation.'
In 1945, in upholding a corporation's decision to omit from its
proxy statement a shareholder proposal calling for a revision of the tax
and antitrust laws,' the SEC decreed that shareholder proposals dealing
with matters of general political or social concern could be categorically
omitted from management's proxy statement.' The release stated that
the rule was intended to force inclusion only of proposals directly relat-
ing to the corporation's affairs.7 This decision was generally interpreted
'SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 24,012 (Sept.
22, 1972), amending 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1971).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
'SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10656 (Dec. 18, 1942).
Id.
'SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 11 Fed. Reg. 10995 (Jan. 3, 1945). The
specific proposals omitted were for an end to "double taxation" of dividends, a revision of the
antitrust laws and their enforcement, and a requirement that all federal laws providing for worker
and farmer representation also provide for investor representation.
'Allen, The Proxy System and the Promotion of Social Goals, 26 Bus. LAWYER 481, 485
(1970).
'The release said- that:
[I]t is the purpose of Rule X-14a-7 [now 14a-8]. . . to place stockholders in a position
to bring before their fellow shareholders matters of concern to them as stockholders in
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as drawing a distinction between proposals over which the corporation
had the power to act, which would be includible in management's proxy
statement, and those matters of general interest to all citizens over
which it had no power to take any action and which therefore belonged
in another forum.8
In 1951 this distinction was judicially expanded' when a federal
district court approved an SEC decision to allow Greyhound Corpora-
tion to omit a shareholder proposal "to consider the advisability of
abolishing the segregated seating system in the South.""0 Seemingly the
corporation had power to act on this proposal, at least to consider
abolishing segregated seating on its buses, and therefore the proposal
should not have been omittable as a general social matter under the
interpretation generally ascribed to the 1945 release." (A mandate that
Greyhound actually abolish segregated seating on its buses would have
been to no effect, however, since in several southern states at that time
such action would have been illegal. As a result, all Greyhound could
do was "consider the advisability" of integrating its buses. 12) Perhaps
the court's holding can be best explained by assuming that the determi-
native factor was the purpose of the shareholder in advancing the pro-
posal rather than the relation of the proposal to the corporation's busi-
ness.
3
In 1952 the SEC explicitly codified the 1945 release by providing
in rule 14a-8(c)(1) that management may omit a shareholder proposal
"if it clearly appears that the proposal is submitted by the security-
holder. . . primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic,
such corporation; that is, such matters relating to the affairs of the company concerned
as are proper subjects for stockholders' action under the laws of the state under which
it is organized. It was not the intent of [the rule] to permit stockholders to obtain the
consensus of other stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general political,
social, or economic nature. Other forums exist for the presentation of such views.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 11 Fed. Reg. 10995 (Jan. 3, 1945).
'Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MIcH. L.
REV. 421, 440-41 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
'Id. at 442.
"Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (1951). The resolution dealt with by the court in
Peck is the single litigated proposal dealing with a moderate social issue up until 1969. Manne,
Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. REV. 481, 486 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Manne].
"SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3638, 11 Fed. Reg. 10995 (Jan. 3, 1945).
"Schwartz 441.
"Note, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 846 (1961). Precisely how
much weight should be given to the judicial sanction of the SEC's no-action letter in Peck is unclear
because the court's opinion dealt only with administrative remedies and never addressed the merits.
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political, racial, religious, social or similar causes."" Under this provi-
sion a decision as to whether or not a proposal was excludable invariably
required an examination of the proponent's motives in making the pro-
posal. This resulted in the exclusion of shareholder proposals, whatever
their relevance to the business of the corporation, if the SEC determined
that they were motivated primarily by concern for political or social
issues. s
Concern with the motives of shareholder-proponents has been the
most strongly criticized aspect of the political and social exclusion of
rule 14a-8. In addition to permitting omission of proposals which are
otherwise proper subjects for shareholder consideration, it has required
that the primary purpose be deciphered from among all the varied
purposes a shareholder may have in offering a proposal. Furthermore,
the SEC had to undertake this task "without psychological expertise
and often without more evidence than papers drafted by the share-
holder's lawyer." Such a subjective test of purpose gave the SEC "wide
discretion to make arbitrary rulings."'"
The concern with motives has also resulted in the anomalous situa-
tion of some public-interest questions being excluded "although they
dealt with subject matters that another shareholder might have been
allowed to raise,"' 7 often because an improper motive was inferred from
an association of the shareholder with a certain political or social
cause.' 8 An additional problem with the rule was its failure to give the
socially concerned shareholder a clearly defined guideline as to which
proposals could be included in management's proxy statement. In addi-
tion to the inherent ambiguity of the rule and the lack of judicial caselaw
on the subject, the SEC published no compendium of rulings and gener-
ally gave no reasons for its decision in any given case. 9 This lack of
"SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4775, 17 Fed. Reg. 11433 (Dec. 11, 1952). The
Director of the Division of Corporate Finance of the SEC said that the purpose of the revision
was to codify the 1945 release. Schwartz 442.
15Heller, Stockholder Proposals, 4 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA COMPILATION 72, 73-74 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as Heller].
6Note, Liberalizing SEC Rule 14a-8 Through the Use of Advisory Proposals, 80 YALE L.J.
845, 855-56 (1971).
"TSchwartz 448.
"Heller 74. Examples of proposals excluded under 14a-8(c) (2) largely because of an associa-
tion of the proponent with a social cause were proposals that a corporation cease investing in liquor
stocks and that women employees be given the same pension rights as men. Id.
"Schwartz 443. 17 C.F.R. § 200.81(c) (1971) provides that the SEC need not make public
any letters of comment or other communications relating to the adequacy of any proxy filed with
the Commission. A reason given for this is that material in a shareholder's proposal may be
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disclosure led to a paucity of information as to the specific standards
used by the SEC in deciding which shareholder proposals violated the
political and social exclusion.
The thrust of the arguments used to justify the exclusion was that
it "operated to exclude frivolous and crackpot proposals as well as those
motivated solely by considerations extraneous to the welfare of the
particular company." ' " A stockholder who owned a nominal share of a
corporation, which he had purchased only so that he would be able to
use the corporation's proxy machinery, should not be permitted to put
the company to the expense of providing him with a sounding board for
his political and social beliefs.
In 1969 another rare judicial sanction was added to the rule when
a court permitted the exclusion of a proposal for an oil company to
encourage underwater oil exploration and the creation of a "stable inter-
national regime" to help foster this.21 In 1970 a group called Campaign
to Make General Motors Responsible, popularly known as Campaign
GM, sought inclusion of nine proposals calculated to stimulate public
debate on the role of corporations in the economy. 22 Under the prevail-
ing interpretation of the political and social exclusion, all of the propos-
als should have been excluded because the admitted purpose of the
proponents was to bring about social change.2 Seven of the proposals
that specifically dealt with social policy issues were in fact excluded.24
One proposal-to increase the board of directors by three mem-
bers-was ordered included as written, probably because it did not show
any social motivation on its face and because enlarging the board of
directors has traditionally been considered to be within the shareholder's
sphere of initiative.2 The other proposal ordered included called for the
establishment of a shareholder Committee for Corporate Responsibil-
ity.2 16 Perhaps the two proposals were included because if General Mo-
"misleading" to the public. Telephone interview with Peter Romeo of the SEC. March 1, 1972.
As part of the recent amendments, however, the SEC also changed this rule so as to treat material
filed with it regarding shareholder proposals as matters of public record. SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 9785, 3 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 66,482 (Sept. 22, 1972).
"Heller 77.
"Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). As was the case in Peck v.
Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679 (1951), the court here also failed to specify the particular
exclusion under which it upheld the decision to omit the shareholder proposal.
"For a thorough review of the Campaign GM experience see Schwartz 421.
"Comment, A Judicial Challenge to the SEC's Shareholder Proposal Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 147, 154 (1971).
21Manne 487.
2Comment, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv., supra note 23, at 155.
21Schwartz 453. The proposal for the shareholder committee was ordered included subject to
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tors had been allowed to exclude all nine proposals, a public controversy
might have arisen over the continued anti-shareholder attitude generally
displayed by the SEC in its proxy rulings. The Campaign GM ruling
was a facesaving compromise in that it "allowed the two proposals on
which the strongest argument for inclusion could be made, while reject-
ing those without supporting precedent." z
The next break in the rule's interpretation, "one that shatter[ed]
past assumptions . . . about the scope of" the rule,"8 was the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Medical Com-
mittee for Human Rights v. SEC.29 A group which had acquired a few
shares of stock in Dow Chemical Company requested that Dow include
in its proxy statement a resolution that any napalm it produced "shall
not be sold to any buyer unless that buyer gives reasonable assurance
that the substance will not be used on or against human beings."3 The
court held that the political and social exclusion could be applied only
to proposals unrelated to a corporation's activities.3 The court inter-
preted "the word 'general' in [the rule] as ruling out attempts to secure
a consensus of shareholder opinion on political issues whose resolution
is not within the corporate power, and distinguished the Medical Com-
mittee's proposal as relating 'to a matter that is completely within the
accepted sphere of corporate activity and control.' ",32 The court viewed
the exclusion as covering only proposals for general social reform, and
not covering proposals for the corporation to conform to a particular
ideology rather than to increase profitability. 33
In addition, the court said that rule 14a was not designed to allow
management to treat "modern corporations with their vast resources as
personal satrapies implementing personal or moral predilections" free
from shareholder interference. Because Dow's management had pub-
licly stated that it was producing napalm for political-and not profit-
making-reasons, the court implied that the Medical Committee's pro-
posal might have to be included regardless of the proponent's motive in
offering it."
certain revisions made by the SEC. Id.
2Manne 488.
2'Chisum, Napalm, Proxy Proposals and the SEC, 12 ARIZ. L. REv. 463, 463 (1971).
2432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
1432 F.2d at 662.
31432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see Comment, Proxy Rule 14a-8. Omission of Shareholder
Proposals, 84 HARv. L. REV. 700, 723 (1971).
'
2Comment, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV., supra note 23, at 151.
2 Chisum, supra note 28, at 472-73.
U43 2 F.2d at 681. The idea was that "management has no right to operate the corporation
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Thus the Medical Committee court seemed to return to the pre-
1951 interpretation of the political and social exclusion under which the
personal "philosophy that may have motivated the resolution is irrele-
vant." The SEC apparently acquiesced in this interpretation," as it
appealed only the administrative law question of whether an SEC no-
action letter was judicially reviewable.37 Since the Medical Committee
decision, the SEC has ordered the inclusion of a shareholder proposal
in a mutual fund's proxy statement requiring the fund to take into
consideration before investing in any corporation: (1) the corporation's
record in pollution control; (2) its record in complying with the civil
rights laws; and (3) "whether the corporation has invested in South
Africa, Rhodesia, or Angola, and if so, what action it has taken to"
change those countries' oppressive political practices.38 It would seem
that under the interpretation of the rule prevailing between the
Greyhound case in 1951 and the Medical Committee case this proposal
would have been clearly omittable by management.
The new rule 14a-8(c)(2) (ii)39 provides that management may omit
a shareholder proposal if it "consists of a recommendation, request or
mandate that action be taken with respect to any matter, including a
general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar cause, that
is not significantly related to the business of the issuer or is not within
the control of the issuer." The release announcing the amendments
comments that the revision was designed to replace the subjective terms
of the rule with objective standards in order to reduce uncertainty in
applying it."
Undoubtedly the new provision is an improvement over the old one.
It does away with the need to examine the motives of shareholder-
proponents of political and social proposals and thus dispenses with the
most subjective element of the old rule. It also furnishes a clearer guide-
line as to which proposals violate the social and political exclusion.
However, the rule does not seem to be of sufficient clarity to create true
certainty in application.
in a manner designed to advance its own social, political, or moral goals to the exclusion of the
goals sought by the shareholders." Allen, supra note 6, at 492.
"Schwartz 461.
I'Manne 489-90.
-"See SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
"Letter from Division of Corporate Regulation, SEC, to Fidelity Trend Fund, Inc., in [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,070 (May 19, 1972).
"SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9784, 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. RE,. 1 24,012 (Sept.
22, 1972).
"SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9784 (Sept. 22, 1972).
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The greatest difficulty in applying the new rule will probably stem
from the interpretation of the phrase, "significantly related to the busi-
ness of the issuer." This may be a financial4 or quantitative" relation,
in the sense that the activity to which the proposal is addressed must
constitute a large and important portion of the corporation's business
activity for the proposal to be allowed. If so, the amendment will likely
serve as a retreat from the decision in the Medical Committee case
because the production of napalm was such a small fraction of Dow's
operations that a shareholder proposal dealing with it would not be
"significantly related" to Dow's business. However, if this interpreta-
tion were adopted, it would render the "significantly related to" lan-
guage of (c)(2) meaningless from redundancy, because rule (c)(5)'s 43
proscription of shareholder proposals relating to the "conduct of ordi-
nary business operations" would presumably apply to proposals dealing
with insignificant aspects of the corporation's business.44
Alternatively, the phrase "significantly related" may refer to a
relationship based on the nature of the business conducted by the com-
pany. For example, "a question concerning off-shore oil drilling could
be significantly related to the business of a corporation in the business
of producing oil even if that corporation did not itself conduct any off-
shore oil drilling."4 If such an interpretation were adopted, the rule
would not provide an objective, workable guideline for the inclusion of
shareholder proposals. Legitimate shareholder-management disagree-
ments over the relation of the business with the political or social issue
involved would be inevitable as it would be very difficult to show con-
vincingly that a company's operations do not have an impact on a given
social or political cause. A proponent could usually establish the rele-
vancy of his social or political proposal to the corporation in any case.
Thus it would be difficult for management to effectively characterize
"Letter from Gerald V. Niesar, Chairman, Corporations Committee, Barristers Club of San
Francisco, to Charles J. Sheppe, Chief, Branch of Regulations and Legislative Matters, Division
of Corporate Finance, SEC, Feb. 2, 1972.
"Letter from Martin Riger, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, to Charles
J. Sheppe, Chief, Branch of Regulations and Legislative Matters, Division of Corporate Finance,
SEC, Feb. 3, 1972.
"Rule 14a-8(c)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1971).
"Nevertheless, this seems to be the interpretation favored by Professor Schwartz, who believes
that the proposal is "probably intended to confine shareholders to consideration only of questions
of policy as contrasted with the minutiae of daily business as discussed in the Medical Committee
case." Letter from Donald E. Schwartz and Roger Foster to Charles J. Sheppe, Chief, Branch of
Regulations and Legislative Matters, Division of Corporate Finance, SEC, Feb. 1, 1972.
"Letter from Gerald V. Niesar, supra note 41.
[Vol. 51
SHAREHOLDER PROXY PROPOSALS
most well drafted proposals as not "significantly related to the business"
of the corporation.
The alternative ground for excluding shareholder proposals (if they
are not "within the control of the issuer") also contains a serious con-
structional problem. The SEC was obviously aware of the difficulties
of interpreting this language because the only change it made in the rule
as initially suggested" was to note that a proposal is not within the
issuer's control if it does not have the power to "effectuate it." Even
with this clarification, a major constructional problem remains as to
exactly what must be within the corporation's control: the specific pro-
posal offered by the shareholder or the ultimate political or social situa-
tion at which it is directed. The shareholder proposal mentioned earlier47
which dealt with a corporation's investments in certain repressive coun-
tries illustrates this problem. In that proposal a shareholder requested
that management take into consideration the racial policies of certain
countries before investing in them. The corporation had the power to
"effectuate" such consideration before making its investments, but ob-
viously there was very little the investment company could do to "effec-
tuate" change in the racial policies of the countries. Whether or not the
new rule will permit exclusion of such shareholder proposals in the
future cannot be predicted until this constructional problem is resolved,
but it would seem that the "control" language would generally exclude
such proposals. Nevertheless, in the context in which the SEC adopted
the changes in rule 14a, it is unlikely that the SEC has retreated from
the position it adopted after the Medical Committee decision, and there-
"SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9432, 36 Fed. Reg. 25432 (Dec. 22, 1971).
"See text accompanying note 38 supra.
"During the period allowed by the SEC for comments concerning the rule's proposed revision,
the theie was constantly heard from management forces that the proxy rules should not permit
inclusion of any proposal of a social or political nature. The feeling generally expressed was that
the attention of management should be solely directed at the earning power of the corporation,
and therefore management should not be required to expend time and money to furnish a forum
for those few shareholders whose interest is to publicize their personal] political and social beliefs
without regard for the profitability of the issuer. It was frequently suggested that there be some
minimum number of shares held by a shareholder-proponent or that he be required to hold his
investment for a minimum period of time before being able to force inclusion of any proposal.
Certainly there is merit to these suggestions in light of the great expense a corporation must incur
in simply going through the process of clearing a decision to omit a proposal with the SEC and in
light of the contemporary phenomenon that a few individuals may buy a single share in many
companies and then send an identical lengthy list of proxy proposals to each. However, given the
increasing centralization of economic power in fewer and fewer corporations, such corporations
cannot avoid having a significant impact on the political and social life of the country and therefore
any rule encouraging isolation of their managements from any shareholder views is probably ill
advised.
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fore the "control" language may not be interpreted as excluding propos-
als dealing with the racial policies of countries in which the issuer is
investing.
Despite the ambiguities in the new rule, it can probably be said that
it was intended to represent a liberalization of the political and social
exclusion of shareholder proposals. Aside from the question of whether
the SEC should have moved in this direction at all," the changes seem
to fall short of supplying a truly objective, workable guideline. It ap-
pears probable that, for the time being, the battle will shift from ques-
tions of whether a particular proposal stems from improper motives of
the shareholder or whether such improper motives dominate his inten-
tions to questions of whether the proposal is "significantly related to the
business of the issuer" or whether it is "within the issuer's control."
CHARLES E. MURPHY, JR.
Securities Regulation-Rule 10b-5-An Alternative to Scalping Pale-
faces Who Speak with Forked Tongues
To implement section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,1 the Securities and Exchange Commission fashioned rule lOb-5,2
which has become an expanding source of litigation for securities viola-
'Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of ,my means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
'The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1971).
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